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Résumé :       Les attaques perpétrées contre les Etats-Unis le 11 septembre 2001 ainsi que d'autres survenues dans le 
monde posent la question de la responsabilité des gouvernements et du secteur privé dans la réduction du 
risque terroriste et, plus particulièrement, celle de savoir qui devrait payer pour les pertes économiques liées 
aux attentats. 
           Suite aux événements du 11 septembre qui causèrent plus de 35 milliards de dollars de pertes 
assurées, les assureurs mirent en garde qu'une autre attaque de cette ampleur pourrait infliger des dommages 
irréparables à l'industrie de l'assurance, et que l'incertitude associée au risque terroriste en faisait, de fait, un 
risque non-assurable. Ainsi, début 2002, pas moins de 45 états américains permettaient aux assureurs 
d'exclure ce risque de leurs couvertures. 
            En cette absence d'offre d'assurance par le secteur privé, la loi du Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 
2002 (TRIA), qui instaure une couverture nationale annuelle à hauteur de 100 milliards de dollars, fut votée 
par le Congrès américain le 26 novembre 2002 et signé par le Président Bush le mois suivant. Cette 
couverture, fondée sur un partenariat entre industrie de l'assurance et gouvernement fédéral, expire le 31 
décembre 2005. A ce jour (juillet 2004), l'après 2005 demeure incertain aux  Etats-Unis. 
             Prenant en compte la réaction des marchés d'assurances américains depuis le 11 septembre 2001 et 
les caractéristiques très particulières du risque terroriste comme risque à grande échelle, nous soutenons que 
le gouvernement fédéral doit continuer à jour un rôle important de concert avec le secteur privé pour couvrir 
les pertes économiques résultantes d'éventuelles attaques futures. Néanmoins, TRIA n'est sans doute pas la 
meilleure manière de résoudre la question.  
             Puisque l'existence d'un système de couverture financière est une composante clé de toute stratégie 
nationale de lutte contre le terrorisme, cet article entend proposer une analyse constructive au débat en passe 
d'être porté à l'agenda au plus haut niveau du pays. En outre, nous proposons un programme spécifique 
alternatif au système TRIA pour couvrir les entreprises opérant aux Etats-Unis quand celui-ci expirera. 
 
Abstract :         The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11) against the United States as well as other large-scale 
attacks worldwide raises the fundamental question as to what are the responsibilities of the public and 
private sectors in reducing the risks of terrorist attacks and who should pay for future losses should the 
terrorists be successful?   
           In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, which inflicted more than 35 billion dollars of insured losses, 
many insurers warned that another event of comparable magnitude could do irreparable damage to the 
industry. Furthermore, they contended that the uncertainties surrounding terrorism risk were so significant 
that it was, in fact, an uninsurable risk.   By early 2002, 45 states in the U.S. permitted insurance companies 
to exclude terrorism. 
         The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA), which provides for up to $100 billion of terrorism 
insurance, was passed by U.S. Congress on November 26, 2002 and signed into law by President Bush the 
following month. The Act, based on risk sharing between the insurance industry and federal government, 
expires on December 31, 2005.  
         Currently it is unclear what type of terrorism insurance program will emerge in the United States after 
2005. Given the developments since September 11th and the specific characteristics of large-scale 
international terrorism, we contend that government needs to continue to play an important role in concert 
with the private sector in providing insurance against losses from this type of extreme event.    
          However, as we suggest in this paper, TRIA may not be the most desirable way for the federal 
government to assist the private sector in providing insurance against terrorism. As a sustainable terrorism 
insurance program is a key component of any national strategy for homeland security and that it is still on 
the agenda in the United States, this papers aims at providing a discussion on several alternatives. It 
suggests a specific national program for covering firms operating in the U.S. against terrorism when TRIA 
expires. 
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Introduction* 
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11) against the United States raises the 
fundamental question as to what are the responsibilities of the public and private sectors in reducing the 
risks of terrorist attacks and who should pay for future losses should the terrorists be successful?   
Prior to September 11, 2001 terrorism coverage in the United States was an unnamed peril in 
most standard all-risk commercial and homeowners policies covering damage to property and contents. 
Even after the first attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) in 1993 insurers did not view terrorism as a 
risk that should be explicitly considered when pricing their commercial insurance policy because losses 
from terrorism had historically been small and, to a large degree, uncorrelated. Attacks of a domestic 
origin were isolated, carried out by groups or individuals with disparate agendas, neither creating major 
economic disruption nor many casualties (Kunreuther and Pauly, 2004).  
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks many insurers warned that another event of comparable 
magnitude could do irreparable damage to the industry. Furthermore, they contended that the 
uncertainties surrounding terrorism risk were so significant that it was, in fact, an uninsurable risk.  By 
early 2002, 45 states in the U.S. permitted insurance companies to exclude terrorism from their policies 
except for workers’ compensation insurance policies that cover occupational injuries without regard to the 
peril that caused the injury. (U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee, 2002). One year after September 
11th , the U.S. remained largely uncovered.  
                                                 
* We are grateful to James Ament, Debra Ballen, Jeffrey Brown, Dan Conway, Christophe Courbage, David 
Cummins, Neil Doherty, William Dove, Martin Feldstein, Rich Franklin, Christian Gollier, Anne Gron, Patricia 
Grossi, Geoff Heal, Carl Hedde, Claude Henry, Dwight Jaffee, Ken Jenkins, Maurice Kilavuka, Paul Kleindorfer, 
Patrick Lagadec, James Macdonald, Don Mango, Linda Moeller, David Moss, Frank Nutter, Paul O’Connell, Mike 
O’Malley, Chandu Patel, Burkhard Pedell, Beverly Porter, Irv Rosenthal, Thomas Russell, Todd Sandler, Jack 
Seaquist, Jason Schupp, Stephen Shore, Kent Smetters, Greg Stern, Craig Tillman, and Gordon Woo for discussions 
and valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.  
    We also appreciated meaningful discussions on related issues with workshop participants at the National Bureau 
of Economics Research (NBER) Insurance Group, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Brookings-Wharton 
Conference on Financial Institutions, Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, Wharton Managing 
and Financing Extreme Events meetings and participants at the World Economic Forum in Davos as well as with 
members of the U.S. Treasury, American Insurance Association, American Reinsurance Association, Geneva 
Association for Study of Insurance Economics, and the OECD Task Force on Terrorism Insurance on which we both 
serve.  The authors wish to thank Lockheed Martin, Radiant Trust, the Institut Veolia Environnement and the 
Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center for financial support of this project. 
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The President and the Congress viewed such a situation as unsustainable. There was thus a call 
for some type of federal intervention (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2002).  The Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA), which provides for up to $100 billion of terrorism insurance, was passed 
by Congress on November 26, 2002 and signed into law by President Bush the following month. The Act, 
based on risk sharing between the insurance industry and federal government, expires on December 31, 
2005. Currently it is unclear what type of terrorism insurance program will emerge in the United States 
after 2005. One possibility is that TRIA will be renewed with the same or a new risk-sharing arrangement 
between the insurance industry and the federal government. However, if the program is terminated, 
alternative solutions will need to be found and implemented.  
Some economists favor a laissez-faire public  policy contending that the private market alone has 
the capacity to develop a market for covering terrorism risks and any government intervention limits the 
development of private solutions. (Gron and Sykes, 2002; Jaffee and Russell, 2003).   Others argue that if 
there is any private market failure, it rests with current government policies (e.g., tax, accounting and 
regulation). Changing these policies so that it would be less costly for insurers to hold surplus capital and 
freely adjust prices would make private insurers more likely to cover the terrorism risk adequately 
(Smetters, 2004).  
Given the developments since September 11th and the specific characteristics of large-scale 
international terrorism, we contend that government needs to continue to play an important role in concert 
with the private sector in providing insurance against losses from this type of extreme event.   However, 
as we suggest in this paper, TRIA may not be the most desirable way for the federal government to assist 
the private sector in providing insurance against terrorism.  
 
Private and Public Sector Responses to 9/11  
America Largely Uncovered  
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 killed nearly 3,000 people from over 90 countries and 
inflicted between $30 and $35 billion in insured losses that was shared by nearly 150 insurers and 
reinsurers worldwide (Lehmann 2004; Dubois, 2004). These attacks were the most costly event in the 
history of insurance, inflicting insured losses nearly twice that of Hurricane Andrew in 1992, the previous 
record holder. Commercial property, business interruption, workers’ compensation, life, health, disability, 
aircraft hull, and general liability insurance lines each paid out claims in the billions of dollars. (Hartwig, 
2002). 
Reinsurers (most of them European) were responsible for the bulk of these claims. For them, the 
9/11 terrorist attacks came on top of a series of catastrophic natural disasters over the past decade and 
portfolio losses due to stock market declines. Having their capital base severely hit, most reinsurers 
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drastically reduced their terrorist offerings or even stopped providing this coverage in the U.S.  Hence in 
the immediate aftermath of September 11th insurers found themselves with significant amounts of 
terrorism exposure from their existing portfolio with limited possibilities of obtaining reinsurance to 
reduce the losses from a future attack. The few that did provide insurance to their clients charged very 
high prices1, so except for a few exceptions only organizations that were required to have this coverage 
actually purchased it.   
The response by the insurance industry to the 9/11 terrorist attacks could have been predicted by 
the literature on insurance firm behavior following catastrophic events.2 In the short run, la rge losses from 
a specific disaster reduce surplus and hence the capacity to provide coverage. Given the high transaction 
costs of raising outside capital to replenish surplus and the relatively high interest rates associated with 
these funds, firms reduce the amount of coverage they offer and increase the price of insurance for the 
particular risk that caused the losses.  Unlike reinsurers, primary insurers must obtain approval from state 
regulatory agencies when implementing new coverage restrictions.  The immediate lack of terrorism 
insurance was due in part to the fact that this exposure was not explicitly priced and then caused large 
insured losses. (Gron and Sykes, 2002).   
In October 2001, the Insurance Services Office (ISO), on behalf of insurance companies, filed a 
request in every state for permission to exclude terrorism from all commercial insurance coverage (U.S. 
General Accounting Office, 2002). The construction and real estate industry lobbied for some type of 
public sector involvement because they claimed that the lack of available terrorism coverage delayed or 
prevented several projects from going forward due to concerns by lenders or investors (U.S. GAO, 2002). 
Such lack of private insurance coverage led to the passage of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002.   
 
 
TRIA: A Temporary Answer  
Under TRIA’s three-year term insurers are obligated to make available an insurance policy 
against terrorism to all their clients, who then have the option of refusing the coverage except for 
workers’ compensation where terrorism protection cannot be excluded from an insurance policy3. Insured 
losses from commercial lines and business interruption insurance are covered only if the U.S. Treasury 
                                                 
1 For example, prior to 9/11, the Chicago’s O’Hare airport carried $750 million of terrorist insurance at an annual 
premium of $125,000. After the terrorist attacks insurers only offered $150 million of coverage at an annual 
premium of $6.9 million (Jaffee and Russell, 2003).  
2 See Winter (1988, 1991), Gron (1994); Doherty and Posey (1997), Cummins and Danzon (1997); Froot and 
O’Connell (1997, 1999). Doherty, Lamm-Tennant and Starks (2003) provide an empirical study of market reactions 
to 9/11. 
3 Although the act expires on December 31, 2005, the “make available” requirement of the act is scheduled to expire 
on December 31, 2004, but the Secretary of Treasury has the authority to extend this requirement by one additional 
year. 
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Secretary certifies the event as an “act of terrorism” carried out by foreign persons or interests4 and only 
for losses in excess of $5 million.  
There is a specific risk-sharing arrangement between the federal government and insurers that 
operates in the following manner. First, the federal government is responsible for paying 90% of each 
insurer’s primary property-casualty losses during a given year above the applicable insurer deductible, up 
to a maximum of $100 billion; the insurance company pays the remaining 10% in addition to the 
deductible. This deductible is determined as a percentage of the direct commercial property and casualty 
earned premiums of each insurer the preceding year. The percentage varies over the three-year operation 
of TRIA: 7% in 2003, 10% in 2004 and 15% in 2005. Many insurance companies found themselves in the 
situation of having to set a price for a risk they would have preferred not to write. Although their exposure 
to losses from terrorism has been reduced through the private-public partnership created by TRIA, it is 
still significant.5   
Second, if the insurance industry suffers terrorist losses that require the government to cover part 
of the claim payments, then these outlays can be partially recouped ex post by the U.S. Treasury through a 
mandatory policy surcharge. In other words, eventually the federal government will pay only for insured 
losses above specific insurance marketplace retention amounts. That amount is specified as $10 billion in 
2003, $12.5 billion for 2004 and $15 billion for 2005. The collection of funds by the government from 
insurers applies to insured losses that are higher than the total market deductible threshold level and 
below the market retention level.  This financial obligation is imposed on insurers writing lines of 
coverage that are included in TRIA. To cover these expenditures insurers can impose a surcharge applied 
to all property and casualty insurance policies whether or not the insured has purchased terrorist coverage.  
An important element of this program is that the federal government does not receive any 
premium for providing this coverage. With respect to catastrophic losses, while the overall effect on the 
crowding-out of private solutions is not clear a priori, there is no way reinsurers can compete with a zero 
cost federal terrorism reinsurance program. This limits the role of reinsurance companies to covering the 
deductible and the 10% share of the insurer’s potential liability from a terrorist attack, a portion of risk for 
which they can quantify their maximum exposure (Dubois, 2004).  
Congress passed TRIA because it is convinced that the existence of a viable terrorism insurance 
market is a cornerstone for a system of national preparedness since it impacts on a variety of economic 
                                                 
4 A domestic terrorist event like the Oklahoma City bombings of 1995, which had been the most damaging terrorist 
attack on domestic soil before 9/11 –killing 168 people and inflicting losses mostly to federal property and 
employees– would not be covered under TRIA. TRIA does not cover life insurance, so that standard policies for this 
coverage will continue to cover these losses. The law also excluded punitive damages from coverage. 
5 The deductible level under TRIA can be large for most US insurers. A recent study estimates that AIG’s 2004 
deductible would be $2.7 billion, others like Travelers, ACE, Chubb or Berkshire would have lower 2004 
deductibles: $928 million, $743 million, $600 million and $200 million, respectively (Morgan Stanley, 2004). 
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activities. The expectation was that TRIA would ease insurers concerns about suffering large losses from 
future disasters and hence they would offer terrorism coverage at premiums that would be attractive to 
firms at risk who would then decide to purchase it. The goal of improving the availability of terrorism 
insurance, particularly for high-risk properties in major metropolitan areas, was achieved with the 
“mandatory offer” requirement. 
 
Empirical Evidence on Market Penetration   
The studies that have been undertaken on the market penetration suggest that there have been few 
takers of terrorism insurance.  The Council of Insurance Agents and Brokers (CIAB) undertook the first 
national survey in March 2003 on the level of demand for coverage (CIAB, March 2003). Almost half of 
the brokers who responded to the survey indicated that fewer than 20% of their largest commercial P&C 
accounts (customers who pay more than $100,000 annually in commission and fees to the broker) had 
purchased terrorism insurance. The low demand was even more pronounced for smaller companies (less 
than $25,000 in commission and fees to the broker): 65% of the brokers indicated that less than 1 in 5 
customers were purchasing this coverage.  
According to another national survey by the CIAB undertaken in Spring 2003, 72% of the brokers 
indicated that their commercial customers were still not purchasing terrorism insurance (CIAB, July 
2003). Even in locations like New York City, the level of demand remained low two years after the 
attacks. During the autumn of 2003, the New York-based insurance brokerage firm, Kaye Insurance 
Associates, surveyed 100 of its clients at middle market real estate, retail and manufacturing in the New 
York area on a series of insurance-related issues, including terrorism. Only 36% of the companies 
indicated that they had purchased terrorism coverage. A recent national survey realized by Marsh Inc on 
2,400 of its policyholders indicated that an average of 27% of responders did purchase terrorism 
insurance in 2003. (Marsh inc, 2004). 
 
 Large firms that protected themselves against terrorism are now typically paying an additional 
20% of the standard commercial property/casualty premium for this insurance. Most small and medium 
firms pay 10% of the standard premium. (Kaye, 2003). If that level of demand continues this means that 
an attack similar to the one on the World Trade Center, would very likely have a much more devastating 
effect on business continuity today than after 9/11 because losses would be much less diversified.    
While TRIA limits the potential losses to the insurance industry, some insurers are still concerned 
about the impact of a large terrorist attack on their ability to pay claims, so that those who purchase 
insurance are aware that they face a credit risk. Some businesses are concerned not only with acts of 
terrorism certified by the federal government but also by the prospect of domestic terrorism, which would 
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not be covered by TRIA. The supply of this coverage by the private sector is still mixed: some insurers 
offer domestic terrorism coverage (sometimes at no cost if the risk is perceived to be low) while others 
exclude it (CIAB, March 2003).  In the latter case, businesses may prefer not to buy any terrorism 
insurance than having just partial protection under TRIA’s terms.  
 
Heuristics and Behavioral Biases 
  It often takes a disaster to get people to pay attention to the need for protection. If they do not 
experience future losses over a relatively short period of time, many individuals assume that the disaster 
“will not happen to me” and that their financial resources could be utilized more effectively elsewhere. 
This behavior has been well documented for natural hazards insurance where resident in hazard-prone 
area often purchase insurance only after suffering a loss from a disaster and then cancel their policies 
several years later should they be unscathed during this period. It is hard to make a convincing case that 
the best return on an insurance policy is no return at all.  In other words, there is a tendency for most 
people to view insurance as an investment rather than as a form of protection (Kunreuther, 1996). 
It is thus not surprising that a few years after 9/11, concern with damage from terrorism has taken 
a back seat. In 2003, most firms believed that if a terrorist attack occurred, it would not affect them, 
whereas in the first few months after 9/11, they had the opposite belief. The aforementioned CIAB study 
indicated that more than 90% of the brokers said that their customers are not considering terrorism 
insurance because they think they do not need it (CIAB, July 2003). These firms feel that insurance, even 
at relatively low premiums, is a bad investment, or even a questionable expense.  Moreover, suppliers of 
terrorism insurance are likely to charge higher premiums than normal because of the large uncertainty 
surrounding this risk and the possibility of a concentrated loss in a metropolitan area that could lead to 
insolvency. The expectation that government may financially aid affected businesses whether or not they 
are covered by insurance, as illustrated by the airline industry following 9/11, may also contribute to the 
unwillingness of firms to purchase a policy.   
 
Is TRIA Failing?  
There seems to be a large difference in the perception of the seriousness of the terrorist threat by 
those who are potential buyers of insurance and those who are supplying coverage under the mandatory 
offer provision. In these circumstances, TRIA will not solve the problem alone.  Accordingly, the U.S. 
General Accounting Office recommended recently that the Secretary of the Treasury, after consultation 
with insurance industry and experts, identify for Congress alternatives that may exist to expand the 
availability and affordability of terrorism insurance after TRIA expires at the end of 2005. (U.S. GAO, 
2004). 
 7
If one wants to create a market for terrorism insurance, both buyers and sellers need to do a more 
systematic analysis of the nature and characteristics of terrorism and the relationship between the price of 
protection and the implied risk. There is no guarantee that in revising their beliefs firms will be willing to 
pay more for coverage or that insurers will greatly reduce their premiums. But there is a much better 
chance that a larger market for terrorism coverage will emerge than if the status quo is maintained.   
 
Why Is Terrorism Different? 
In order to develop key features of a sustainable terrorism insurance program for the U.S., it is 
important to examine the special features of the risk and its implications for setting premiums, 
determining how much coverage can be provided by the private sector and the appropriate role that the 
public sector can play in creating a more sustainable market for protection.  
 
Evidence on Change in the Nature of the Risk 
There is empirical evidence that the characteristics of terrorism risk have changed over the past 
decade. There has been a significant rise in casualties from transnational incidents in the 1990s, even 
though the total number of attacks worldwide has been decreasing. (U.S. Department of State, 2003; 
Enders and Sandler, 2000).  One possible explanation for this change in the nature of terrorist attacks is 
the increasing number of religious-based terrorist groups, most of whom advocate mass casualties. 
(Hoffman, 1998; Pillar, 2001; Stern, 2003).6   
The main concern today when dealing with challenges for terrorism risk coverage relates to the 
potentiality of major terrorist, including those using losses from chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear weapons of mass-destruction (CBRN). These are covered under TRIA only if the primary insurer 
has included these risks in its standard commercial policy. (Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, forthcoming).   
In this regard, the 9/11 events and the anthrax attacks during the fall of 2001 have revealed an 
underrecognized new kind of vulnerability of our critical infrastructure sectors as defined by U.S. 
Presidential Decision Directive 63 (White House, 2003). In order to inflict mass casualties or large-scale 
threat, terrorists may not even try to destroy some elements of a network infrastructure. Rather they are 
likely to seek ways to use the huge diffusion capacity of our large critical networks and turn them against 
the target population so that each element of the network (e.g. every aircraft, every piece of mail) now 
becomes a potential weapon, and the entire network is at risk. (Michel-Kerjan, 2003-a).  Thus following 
                                                 
6 Fundamentalist-based terrorism appears to have started in the fourth quarter of 1979 with the takeover of the U.S. 
Embassy in Teheran (Enders and Sandler, 2000). In 1980, there were only two religious groups out of the 64 active 
terrorist organizations. Over the next 15 years, the number increased, so that by 1995 46 percent of the terrorist 
groups were classified as having religion as a principal motivator for their actions. (Hoffman, 1997).   
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the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the FAA shut down the US civilian airline network, the first time such a 
decision had ever been made. Similar action was also serious ly considered for the US postal network 
during the Anthrax crisis (Lagadec and Michel-Kerjan, 2004). 
More generally, the response to a terrorist attack can be highly disruptive by imposing negative 
externalities on the elements of the infrastructure that are not actually at risk as well as on every other 
networks that depends on it. These reactions can create economic losses that are greater than the direct 
impacts of the attack itself. Terrorism insurance today will not provide coverage for many of these 
indirect losses resulting from the response to an attack7.  
 
Dynamic Uncertainty  
In contrast to natural hazards where the large historical databases on past losses and scientific 
studies on the risks are in the public domain, data on terrorist groups’ activities and current threats are 
normally kept secret for national security reasons. Some time series data on past terrorist acts are in the 
public domain, but they may not reflect the changing expectations of planned activities of terrorist groups. 
Whereas a natural disaster is observable, so one can trace the factors that caused the event, the elements 
leading to a terrorism attack may be difficult or impossible to determine. For example, the public still has 
no idea today who manufactured and disseminated the anthrax in the U.S. mailings during the autumn of 
2001.  
  The scale and configuration of terrorist attacks of 9/11 represent a new type of vulnerability. 
Since terrorists are likely to adapt their strategy as a function of their own resources and their knowledge 
of the vulnerability of the entity they want to attack, the nature of the risk is continuously evolving. 
Terrorists may respond to security measures by shifting their attention to more vulnerable targets. They 
also may change the nature of their attack if protective measures in place make the likelihood of success 
of the original option much lower than another course of action (e.g. switching from hijacking to bombing 
a plane). This substitution effect has to be considered when evaluating the effectiveness of specific 
policies aimed at curbing terrorism8 (Enders and Sandler, 1993).  
 The likelihood and consequences of a terrorist attack is determined by a mix of strategies and 
counterstrategies developed by a range of stakeholders and changing over time. This leads to dynamic 
                                                 
7 For example, the City of Chicago was denied for insurance compensation for business losses that resulted from 
FAA’s decision to ban takeoffs of all civilian aircraft regardless of destination on September 11, 2001. The specific 
clause of the insurance contract for business interruption specified covering only “direct result of a peril not 
excluded”, imposing a territorial limitation that excludes interdependent effects (U.S. District Court, 2004). 
8 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director, George Tenet, suggested this behavior in his prophetic unclassified 
testimony of February 7, 2001, (prior to 9/11) when he said: “As we have increased security around government and 
military facilities, terrorists are seeking out ‘softer’ targets that provide opportunities for mass casualties” (CIA, 
2001). Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the Al Qaeda chief of military operations arrested in March 2003, has since 
explicitly admitted such a soft target strategy (Woo, 2004).   
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uncertainty (Michel-Kerjan, 2003-b). In that spirit, while large-scale terrorism risk resembles war risk, it 
is more complex. When a country is at war, there is an identifiable opponent and a well-specified 
geographical area for combat. With respect to terrorism, the enemy is comprised of networked groups 
throughout the world who can attack anywhere and at any time. This presents special challenges for 
insurers who need information in order to establish predictability for at least one year, but preferably over 
a period of years. Even perfect information on the likelihood of an attack during the coming month does 
little for an insurer that issues annual policies. 
 
Interdependent Security 
One of the positive features of insurance as a policy tool is that it encourages investment in 
protective measures through premium reductions. If the insurer can reduce its claims by having the 
policyholder undertake loss reduction measures then it can reward this action by lowering the cost of 
insurance. Suppose there are interdependencies between individuals or firms so that, even if you invest in 
protection, there is still the possibility of your being contaminated by others who did not undertake such 
measures. Insurers will take this into account when determining what premium to charge you for coverage 
against a particular risk.  
Kunreuther and Heal (2003) and Heal and Kunreuther (2003) have addressed this issue of 
interdependency in the context of airline security where the actions of one airport or one airline can 
directly impact on the others. They formally show with specific game theoretic models that the more 
airlines that do not invest in security measures, the less incentive any airline has to incur this cost because 
passengers (possibly terrorists) and bags (possibly containing a bomb) can be transferred from an 
unsecured airline to one that has been secured without being inspected in the process.9   
 
More generally, the interdependent risks across firms may lead all of them to decide not to invest 
in protection. They show that private insurer will not internalize those negative externalities in 
determining what premiums to charge against a specific risk. A social insurance program can institute 
regulations and standards to reduce these negative externalities to achieve a socially optimal level of 
investment in protection.  
 
                                                 
9 One needs to examine airport security in the same light. The crash of PanAm103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 
December 1988 was due to a bag loaded at Malta Airport on Malta Airlines transferred to a Pan Am feeder in 
Frankfort and onto PanAm 103 in London set to explode only if the plane flew over 28,000 feet (Lockerbie, 2001).  
The collapse of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 could be attributed in part to the failure of security 
at Logan airport in Boston where terrorists were able to board planes that flew into the twin towers. 
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Government Influencing the Risk  
There is an even more fundamental difference between terrorism and other extreme events: 
international terrorism is a matter of nationa l security as well as foreign policy. Government can influence 
the level of risk of future attacks through appropriate counter-terrorism policies and international 
cooperation to enhance general security and reduce the probability that attacks will occur. Some decisions 
made by a government as part of the foreign policy can also affect the will of terrorist groups to attack 
this country or its interest abroad (Lapan and Sandler, 1988; Lee, 1988; Pillar, 2001).10 On a policy level, 
it is surprising to us how this fundamental nature of terrorism has not been highlighted in the current 
debate on public -private responsibilities for providing adequate financial protection to victims of 
terrorism. 
Federal and state governments can also devote part of their budget to the development of specific 
measures on U.S. soil to protect the country. The creation of the new U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security in 2002 confirms the importance of this role in managing the terrorist risk. In this regard, 
government is an actor that can influence the risk and provide relevant information to the private sector 
for improving global security.  
In that sense, terrorism risk is partly under the government’s control and will change depending 
on at least two complementary strategies by the defenders. The first entails protective measures that could 
be adopted by those at risk. The second consists of actions taken by governments to enhance general 
security and reduce the probability that attacks will occur. In this sense, terrorism is a mixed private-
public good.   
 
A Sustainable Terrorism Insurance Program on the Agenda   
 
Congress requires Treasury to assess the effectiveness of TRIA no later than June 30, 2005 to 
determine whether it should be renewed, an alternative terrorist insurance program be substituted for it or 
insurance coverage left solely in the hands of the private sector. As input into this process we now 
evaluate several alternative terrorism insurance programs.  
 
Scenario 1. Laissez-faire Policy 
 
In this scenario TRIA expires and a private market for terrorism insurance is allowed to operate 
without any federal backstop nor mandatory offer requirement. Private insurers protected themselves 
                                                 
10 Large-scale terrorist attacks in Madrid, Spain on March 11, 2004, have been credited with altering the outcome of 
the Spanish election that occurred three days later, and hence raises the question as to the potential role of terrorism 
as a global political weapon. 
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against catastrophic losses through the purchase of reinsurance and catastrophe bonds. Businesses are 
covered to the extent that their brokers can negotiate insurance terms that are affordable.  
A key question is what would be the market capacity to provide terrorism insurance? As of today 
with TRIA in place, reinsurers have cautiously returned to the market but most insurers have not 
purchased reinsurance probably as a result of relatively high prices charged for a limited amount of 
available coverage (U.S. GAO, 2004). Moreover, while alternative risk transfers, such as options and 
catastrophe bonds, emerged over the past decade to cover large losses from natural disasters by 
transferring part of the risks to the capital markets, except for a few special issuances11, a sustainable 
market for catastrophe bonds to cover losses from terrorist attacks has not emerged since 9/11. 
(Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, forthcoming; U.S. GAO, 2003).  
Some lessons learned from other extremes events provide insight into what is likely to happen 
under a laissez-faire scenario. Over time, fewer businesses are like ly to purchase terrorism coverage if 
there are no future attacks, as the risk will be below the firm’s threshold level of concern. This may be 
considered an efficient outcome until after the next terrorist attack where providing adequate financial 
protection to victims of catastrophes will become a national issue. Facing potential catastrophic damage, 
the private sector may again severely restrict the insurance supply or even refuse to provide coverage. In 
other words, insurers and reinsurers fold up their tents temporarily again, as they did it after 9/11. Under 
public pressure, it would be politically impossible for the government not to compensate the uninsured for 
damage they sustain. In such a case, another TRIA-like bill is likely to pass.  
There is empirical evidence from other disasters to suggest that a laissez faire program will be 
unsustainable. Following Hurricane Andrew in 1992, insurers were prepared to cancel windstorm 
coverage in hurricane-prone areas of Florida. The state legislature passed a law the next year that 
individual insurers could not cancel more than 10 percent of their homeowners’ policies in any county in 
any one year and that they could not cancel more than 5 percent of their property owners’ policies 
statewide.  At the same time the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund was created to relieve pressure on 
insurers should there be a catastrophic loss from a future disaster (Lecomte and Gahagan, 1998).  In 
California insurers refused to renew homeowners’ earthquake policies after the 1994 Northridge 
earthquake and the California Earthquake Authority was formed in 1996 with funds from insurers and 
reinsurers (Roth, Jr., 1998). Moreover, there has been little movement and coordination from insurers and 
                                                 
11 The first terrorism catastrophe bond was issued in Europe in August 2003. The world governing organization of 
association football (soccer), the FIFA, which organizes the 2006 World Cup in Germany, developed a bond to 
protect its investment under very specific conditions.  The catastrophe bond is not, however, a terrorist bond per se 
but covers against both natural and terrorist extreme events that would result in the cancellation of the final World 
Cup game without the possibility of it being re-scheduled to 2007.   
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reinsurers toward developing a private-industry program that could provide sufficient capacity without 
government participation (U.S. GAO, 2004). 
  
Scenario 2. Mutual Insurance for Specific Lines 
An alternative to scenario 1 is the creation of mutual insurance pools to deal with specific lines of 
coverage. This solution has the advantage of spreading the risk over a large number of insurers who join 
these pools, but it is unclear how this alternative would provide adequate coverage against mega-
terrorism. 
 For example, a group of fourteen U.S. workers’ compensation insurers that accounts for roughly 
40% of the market recently assessed the feasibility of a workers’ compensation (WC) terrorism 
reinsurance pool, since terrorism protection cannot be excluded from WC coverage  (Towers Perrin, 
2004). The feasibility study, released in March 2004, concluded that while the pool could create some 
additional capacity for each of its members, it would not be enough to matter in the case of a large-scale 
terrorism attack. The report concluded that extreme terrorist attacks could inflict workers’ compensation 
losses of $90 billion, three times the capital backing of the private industry’s capacity for covering this 
line of business. In addition the report concluded that it would be difficult to reach an agreement on the 
rates that should be charged based on terrorism exposure of pool participants (Towers Perrin, 2004).  
 
Scenario 3. A Private-Public Partnership 
 
 In our view a partnership between the insurance industry and the government is essential for 
terrorism coverage when TRIA expires. Here we outline a program whereby TRIA is modified to provide 
terrorism coverage through a four-layer private-public partnership. 
The insured would be responsible for the initial level of losses through a specific deductib le on its 
policy. The size of the deductible could be based on the nature of loss reduction measures in which the 
insured would have invested. The more that the investor has protected itself against a potential loss, the 
lower the deductible would be for the same premium.  For losses above the deductible, we propose that 
insurers and reinsurers cover middle -sized losses up to a specific threshold (market retention). One option 
for the private sector would be the creation of a pool arrangement similar to current programs in European 
countries. There could be a pre-existing arrangement for the pool to obtain federal loans at low rates 
should the reserve of the pool not be sufficient during its first years of operation to reimburse its liability 
in case of major attack.   
Additional layers of coverage could be placed with the reinsurance market. If their financial 
commitment is well-defined and limited to a reasonable amount of coverage, a few large insurers and 
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reinsurers could take the lead of developing a consortium of international insurers and reinsurers to cover 
a specific trench of the program, as has been done by Swiss Re in France or Berkshire Hathaway in 
Germany. (Michel-Kerjan and Pedell, 2004). If reinsurers are willing to provide substantial amounts of 
coverage this may convince also investors to provide capital for a terrorist cat bond market to emerge. 
Above the threshold of private coverage, state and federal reinsurance could cover 100% of losses 
for extreme events rather than just 90% covered under TRIA.  Indeed, the public sector has the capacity to 
diversify the risks over the entire population and to spread past losses to future generations of taxpayers, a 
form of cross-time diversification that the private market cannot achieve because of the incompleteness of 
inter-generational private markets and legal limitations for insurers to accumulate financial reserves 
(Gollier, 2002; Smetters, 2004). While there may be a cost associated with federal intergenerational 
diversification, as it would be done through the tax system, this is particularly important for extreme 
losses that pose severe problems of liquidity and possible insolvency to insurers.  
Such government reinsurance protection should not be provided gratis as is currently done under 
TRIA with losses imposed ex post on every taxpayer. Although insurers would increase their premiums to 
reflect such a reinsurance cost, the resulting rates would more closely reflect the terrorist risk. The 
resulting premiums should also encourage insurers to give more substantial premium/deductible 
reductions to those insured firms who invest in protection, since these mitigation measures would reduce 
the potential magnitude of the catastrophic losses from a terrorist attack and reduce the amount of federal 
reinsurance that the insurer would require.  
  
Will a Pool Arrangement Work? 
One advantage of the creation of an insurance pool to cover the second layer of the program 
would be, beyond the mutualization of the risk among several stakeholders, to link insurance with global 
protection and mitigation measures more systematically as well as internalizing some of the externalities 
and interdependencies associated with terrorism risk. For example, insurers may want to require ex ante 
specific risk reduction measures as a condition for coverage and negotiate a specific arrangement with the 
public sector for reimbursement of business interruption losses resulting from federal responses to an 
attack, such as shutting down the airlines or the postal system. If a pool arrangement emerges as a 
possible program, then national associations of insurers and reinsurers, in partnership with the Treasury, 
will play a key role in its implementation.  
There are, however, a set of challenges associated with the creation and operation of a pool 
arrangement. Should it be pre or post-funded? Should participation in the pool be voluntary or 
mandatory? To what extent could the pool diversify the risk and create additional capacity for each of its 
members? What rate scale should be charged by the pool and how could one reach a consensus among all 
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potential members? What could be the relationship between premiums charged by primary insurers to 
policyholders and those charged by the pool to covers each member insurer?   
In that regard, potential losses associated with a large range of scenarios of attacks are better 
understood today through the development of new terrorism risk models. These terrorism models 
developed since September 11th could be used to establish a national scale of rates charged by the pool 
based on terrorism exposure. (Kunreuther, Michel-Kerjan and Porter, in press).  There are lessons to be 
learned from abroad so as how rates charged by pools established in other countries have been defined 
and how those programs work in practice. (Godard et al., 2002; Michel-Kerjan and Pedell, 2004).  
 
Should Coverage Be Mandatory? 
Existing institutions, such as banks and financial institutions, could require coverage as a 
condition for loans and mortgages to protect their own investments. Property owners would assume the 
cost of their risk through their insurance premiums and would be aided financially in their recovery 
process should a terrorist attack occur by being able to file a claim to cover their direct losses as well as 
business interruption. Rents to tenants in commercial buildings may increase to reflect the cost of terrorist 
insurance coverage.  Mandatory coverage for these and other risks would obviously solve many difficult 
problems. First, there would be no concern about adverse selection since everyone would be insured. 
Second, it would eliminate the demand for federal aid sure to arise after an attack by those who failed to 
purchase insurance. Third, it would expand market for terrorism insurance, stabilize premium income and 
enable the insurance pool to diversify its risks across structures and geographical areas. By increasing the 
size of the pool, the chances would be reduced of a catastrophic loss exceeding the pool’s resources. 
 To date the question as to whether insurance should be mandatory has not been explicitly raised 
in discussions of the future of terrorism insurance in the United States, whereas it was discussed 50 years 
ago as part of a national debate on the creation of war damage insurance program in the aftermath of 
World War II (Hirshleifer, 1953). It would likely take center stage if other terrorist attacks, even small-
sized ones, occurred on U.S. soil. It is also worth noting that the more an industrialized country has 
suffered from international terrorism, the more likely such coverage has been made mandatory as 
illustrated by the cases of France and Spain.12  
It is obviously much easier to defend a voluntary private market approach for providing terrorism 
insurance when no losses have been incurred.  The lessons of September 11th indicate that there will be 
strong pressure for public sector involvement following any large-scale disaster. Considering some type 
                                                 
12 In Israel compensation of victims of terrorism is funded by property tax charged ex ante against all property 
owner in the country. 
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of required insurance before such an event occurs should alleviate the political pressure for federal relief 
and facilitate the recovery process through insurance claims dispersed rapidly to those suffering losses.  
 
Conclusion: TRIA and Beyond 
The White House has defined Homeland Security as “the concerted effort to prevent attacks, 
reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do 
occur” (White House, 2002, p.2). Part of that “recovery component” is the need for insurance coverage. 
Prior to the passage of TRIA there was a national debate on the role and responsibilities of the federal 
government and the private sector in providing adequate protection to victims of terrorism. Today we 
believe there is a need for a private-public partnership to achieve that goal but question whether TRIA is 
the most appropriate form for this to take. If nothing is done after TRIA expires, insurers will probably 
significantly increase the price of coverage since free federal reinsurance will not be available. Many 
firms may decide not to offer this coverage to their clients since they will not required to do so, as the “.  
mandatory offer” requirement will stop as well as. This means that another mega-attack such as the one 
on 9/11 could have a much greater financial and social impact on the United States because much the loss 
would not be diversified through insurance and reinsurance worldwide.  
Finally, while this paper makes the case for private-public partnerships for dealing with terrorism, 
one should recognize that creating and developing such arrangements calls for collaboration between a 
wide range of actors with different agenda within the public sector and industry. Developing such 
partnerships is challenging in a country where 85% of the critical infrastructure is owned or operated by 
the private sector.  The U.S. fede ral government, because of its responsibilities to protect the citizenry, 
should partner more systematically with the private sector to develop effective protection measures 
nationwide and link them to a large and sustainable insurance market for terrorism risk that would assure 
the social and economic continuity of the country should other attacks occurs. 
 16
 
References 
 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 2001. 
Statement by Director of Central Intelligence George 
J. Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence on the "Worldwide Threat 2001: National 
Security in a Changing World". CIA: February 7. 
Council of Insurance Agents and Brokers. 2003. 
“Commercial Market Index Survey.”  News Release, 
July 22. 
Council of Insurance Agents and Brokers. 2003. 
“Many Commercial Interests Are Not Buying 
Terrorism Insurance, New CIAB Survey Show.”  
News Release, March 24. 
Cummins, J. David and Danzon, Patricia. 1997. 
“Price, Financial Quality and Capital Flows in 
Insurance Markets.” Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, 6, pp.3-38.  
Doherty, Neil, Lamm-Tennant, Joan, and Starks, 
Laura. 2003. “Insuring September 11th: Market 
Recovery and Transparency”. Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty. 26: 2/3, pp. 179-199. 
Doherty, Neil and Posey, Lisa. 1997 “Availability 
Crises in Insurance Markets: Optimal Contracts with 
Asymmetric Information and Capacity Constraints.” 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. 15, pp.55-80.  
Dubois, Jacques. 2004. “Oversight of the Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Program”, Testimony of the Chairman 
and CEO of Swiss Re America Holding on behalf of 
Swiss Re before the US Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. May 18. 
Enders, Walter and Todd, Sandler. 2000. “Is 
Transnational Terrorism Becoming More 
Threatening?” Journal of Conflict Resolution. 44: 3, 
pp. 307-332. 
Enders, Walter and Sandler, Tood.  1993. “The 
Effectivenes of Antiterrorism Policies: A Vector- 
Autoregression Intervention Analysis.” American 
Political Science Review. 87 (4): 829-844. 
 Froot, Kenneth and O’Connell, Paul. 1999. “The 
Pricing of U.S. Catastrophe Reinsurance”. In Froot, 
Kenneth. (ed.). The Financing of Catastrophe Risks. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Froot, Kenneth and O’Connell, Paul. 1997. “On 
the Pricing of Intermediated Risk: Theory and 
Application to Catastrophe Reinsurance”. Working 
Paper 6011 , National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Godard, Olivier, Henry, Claude, Lagadec, 
Patrick and Erwann Michel-Kerjan. 2002.  Treatise 
on New Risks. Precaution, Crisis Management, 
Insurance. Paris: Editions Gallimard, Folio-Actuel. 
 
 
 
 
 
Gollier, Christian. 2002. “Insurability”. Paper 
presented at the NBER Insurance Group Workshop. 
Cambridge. MA, February 1. 
Gron, Anne and Sykes, Alan. 2002. “Terrorism 
and Insurance Markets: A Role for the Government as 
Insurer?” Regulation. Winter 2002-2003, pp.44-51 
Gron, Anne. 1994. “Capacity Constraints and 
Cycles in Property-casualty Insurance Markets.” Rand 
Journal of Economics. 25:1, pp.110-127. 
Hartwig, Robert. 2002.  “September 11, 2001:  The 
First Year. One Hundred Minutes of Terror that 
Changed the Global Insurance Industry Forever.” 
Insurance Information Institute. 
Heal, Geoffrey and Kunreuther, Howard.        
2003. “You Only Die Once: Managing Discrete 
Interdependent Risks.”  Working Paper 9885 , National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. 
Hirshleifer, Jack. 1953. “ War Damage Insurance.” 
Review of Economics and Statistics. 35:2, pp.144-153. 
Hoffman, Bruce. 1998. Inside Terrorism. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Hoffman, Bruce. 1997. “The Confluence of 
International and Domestic Trends in Terrorism.”  
Terrorism and Political Violence. 9: 2, pp. 1-15. 
Jaffee, Dwight and Russell, Thomas. 2003. 
“Market Under Stress: The Case of Extreme Event 
Insurance” in Richard Arnott, Bruce Greenwald, 
Ravi Kanbur and Barry Nalebuff (eds), Economics for 
an Imperfect World: Essays in Honor of Joseph E. 
Stiglitz. MIT Press. 
Kaye Insurance Associates . 2003. Middle Market 
Survey. October 2003, New York. 
Kunreuther, Howard and Mark, Pauly. 2004. 
“What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You: Terrorism 
Losses and All Perils Insurance.” Paper presented at 
the Annual Meeting of the American Economic 
Association, San Diego, January 2004. 
Kunreuther, Howard and Michel-Kerjan, 
Erwann. Insurability of (Mega)-Terrorism. 
Challenges and Perspectives. Report for the OECD 
Task Force on Terrorism Insurance. Paris: 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. Forthcoming. 
Kunreuther, Howard, Michel-Kerjan, Erwann 
and Porter, Beverly. (in press). “Extending 
Catastrophe Modeling to Terrorism and Other Extreme  
Events” in Patricia Grossi and Howard Kunreuther 
(eds) with Chandu Patel. Catastrophe Modeling: A 
New Approach to Managing Risk. Kluwer Academic 
Publisher, Boston. 
  17 
Kunreuther, Howard and Heal, Geoffrey. 2003. 
“Interdependent Security.” Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty. 26:2/3, pp. 231-249. 
Kunreuther, Howard. 1996. ”Mitigating Disaster 
Losses through Insurance’. Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty. 12, pp.171-187. 
Lagadec, Patrick and Michel-Kerjan, Erwann.  
2004. “Meeting the Challenge of Interdependent 
Critical Networks Under Threat: The Paris 
Initiative, ‘Anthrax and Beyond’”. Paper presented at 
the 12th Conference on Postal and Delivery 
Economics, Cork, Ireland, June 2-5. 
Lapan, Harvey and Sandler, Tood. 1988. “To 
Bargain or Not to Bargain: That is The Question”. 
American Economic Review. 78:2, 16-20. 
Lecomte, Eugene and Gahagan, Karen. 1998. 
“Hurricane Insurance Protection in Florida” in 
Kunreuther Howard and Roth, Richard, Sr.  (eds.), 
Paying the Price: The Status and Role of Insurance 
Against Natural Disasters in the United States.   
Washington, D.C: Joseph Henry Press. 
Lee, Dwight.  1988. “Free Riding and Paid Riding in 
the Fight Against Terrorism”. American Economic 
Review. 78: 2, 22-26. 
Lehmann, Raymond. 2004.  “Twin Towers Insured 
Loss Estimate Drops to Between $30 and $35 Billion” 
Bestwire   May 10.  
    Lockerbie, Verdict. 2001. Her Majesty’s Advocate, 
v. Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi and Al Amin 
Khalifa Fhimah, Case No.: 1475/99. High Court of 
Justiciary at Camp Zeist: January 31. 
 Marsh Inc. (2004).”Marketwatch: Property 
Terrorism Insurance”, April 
Michel-Kerjan, Erwann. 2003-b. “Large-scale 
Terrorism: Risk Sharing and Public Policy.” Revue 
d’Economie Politique. 113: 5, pp. 625-648. 
Michel-Kerjan, Erwann. 2003-a. “New 
Vulnerabilities in Critical Infrastructures: A U.S. 
Perspective.” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management. 11: 3, pp.132-141. 
Michel-Kerjan, Erwann and Pedell, Burkhard.  
2004. “Terrorism Risk Coverage after 9/11: A 
Comparison of New Public-Private Partnerships in 
France, Germany and the U.S.”  Working paper, 
Center for Risk Management and Decision Processes, 
The Wharton School. 
Morgan Stanley. 2004. Assessing Insurer’s 
Terrorism Risk. Equity Research, Insurance – Property 
and Casualty,  March 19. 
Pillar, Paul. 2001. Terrorism and U.S. Foreign 
Policy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.  
Roth, Richard, Jr.  1998.  “Earthquake Insurance 
Protection in California” in Kunreuther Howard and 
Roth, Richard, Sr.  (eds.), Paying the Price: The Status 
and Role of Insurance Against Natural Disasters in 
the United States.   Washington, D.C: Joseph Henry 
Press.  
Smetters, Kent. 2004. “Insuring Against Terrorism: 
The Policy Challenge”. Paper presented at The 
Brookings-Wharton Conference on Financial Services. 
Washington, DC, January 8-9.  
Stern, Jessica. 2003. Terror in the Name of God: 
Why Religious Militants Kill. New York: Harper 
Collins. 
Towers Perrin. 2004. “Workers’ Compensation 
Terrorism Reinsurance Pool Feasibility Study”. 
March. 
U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee.   2002.   
Economic Perspectives on Terrorism Insurance. 
Washington, DC: May 2002. 
U.S. Department of State. 2003. Patterns of Global 
Terrorism-2002. Washington, D.C.: April. 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois, Eastern Division . 2004. City of Chicago v. 
Factory Mutual Insurance Company. 02C7023 . March 
11. 
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). 2004.  
Terrorism Insurance. Effects of the Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act of 2002. Testimony of Richard Hillman. 
GAO-04-720T. Washington, D.C.: April 28. 
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). 2003.  
Catastrophe Insurance Risks. Status of Efforts to 
Securitize Natural Catastrophe and Terrorism Risk . 
GAO-03-1033. Washington, D.C.: September 24. 
 U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). 2002.  
“Terrorism Insurance: Ris ing Uninsured Exposure to 
Attacks Heightens Potential Economic 
Vulnerabilities.” Testimony of Richard J. Hillman 
before the Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations, Committee on Financial Services, 
House of Representatives.  February 27. 
White House. 2003. National Strategy for Physical 
Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets.  
Washington, DC, February 2003. 
White House. 2002. National Strategy for 
Homeland Security.  Washington, DC, July 2002. 
Winter, Ralph. 1991. “The Liability Insurance 
Market”. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 5: 3, pp. 
115-136. 
Winter, Ralph. 1988. “The Liability Insurance 
Crisis and Dynamics of Competitive insurance 
Markets.” Yale Journal of Regulation . 5, pp.455-499. 
Woo, Gordon.  2004. “Parameterizing the Evolving 
Threat” in Risk Management Solutions, Managing 
Terrorism Risk in 2004. 
 
 
 
